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INTRODUCTION
This matter involved the enforcement of Rule 26's disclosure requirements.
Plaintiff was permitted to testify about medical opinions, causation and permanency
14

despite never providing any notice or disclosure of the same. The trial court did not
evaluate the untimely disclosure under the proper standard - good cause/no prejudice but instead allowed Plaintiff to testify. This violates the spirit of Rule 26 and undermines
the purpose of the rule altogether.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion in limine where

plaintiff failed to provide initial disclosures and pre-trial disclosures in accordance with
U.R.C.P. 26?
i) Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Lawrence v. MountainStar
Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40, ,I 16, 320 P.3d 1037.
ii) Preserved in record at R. 180, motion in limine.
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiff to offer opinion evidence, and

not requiring and medical expert, regarding causation, treatment and damages?
i) Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Lawrence v. MountainStar
Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40, ,I 16, 320 P.3d 1037.
ii) Preserved in record at R. 426, trial objections.

3
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STATE:MENT OF THE CASE

This matter arises from an incident which occurred at Solitude Resort on March 7,
2014. The parties were involved in an altercation wherein Defendant struck Plaintiff in
the nose.
On September 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendant in which he
alleges that the incident caused him permanent physical injury, psychological injury and
the need for future medical treatment. (R. 1-5) On September 29, 2014, Defendant filed
his answer, prose. (R. 10-11) On October 1, 2014, a Notice of Event Due Dates was
issued which ordered Plaintiff to provided initial disclosures by October 13, 2014. (R. 12)
On May 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability.
(R. 13) On June 8, 2015, fact discovery ended.

On September 10, 2015, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding liability.
(R. 53) That same day, Plaintiff filed a first request for a hearing as to damages, one

month prior to the expert discovery deadline. (R. 55) Plaintiff never disclosed an expert
witness.
An evidentiary hearing was set for February 16, 2016, and subsequently
rescheduled for March 23, 2016. On March 18, 2016, Defendant filed bankruptcy placing
an automatic stay on the case. (R. 69) On August 8, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court granted
Plaintiff relief from the stay, thereby allowing this matter to proceed.
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On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff again requested an evidentiary hearing. (R. 73)

~

On September 7, 2017, a scheduling conference was held and the matter was set for a
November 2, 2017.
On October 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to continue the evidentiary hearing
on the basis that 1) the plaintiff is unable to attend due to employment; and, 2) the
plaintiff has not been able yet to obtain the results of an MRI to determine whether he
suffered a traumatic brain injury. (R. 88) On that same day Defendant filed his objection
to the continuance, noting that Plaintiff had never made any disclosures in the case. (R.

96)
In the memo, Plaintiff's counsel states:
vi
"With respect to the potential "Traumatic Brain Injury," without the subject 1v1RI
and physician~ report, it is unknown at this time as to whether or not the Plaintiff
suffered a "Traumatic Brain Injury," and if so, what caused such. The mere
possibility of the Plaintiff suffering a "Traumatic Brain Injury," was newly
discovered. Specifically, had it not been for the Plaintiff's mother's statements to
counsel as to the Plaintiff's "dramatic personality changes,"
Plaintiff's counsel would never have known about such. Such were unknown until
such time, as the Plaintiff was not aware of and/or was in denial of said
"personality changes," As a matter of fairness and equity to the Plaintiff, the
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victim of a horrific assault, the mere existence of a "Traumatic Brain Injury"
should be at least determined.
On October 30, 2017, Defendant filed his motion in limine seeking to preclude
Plaintiff from using any evidence for failing to provide both initial disclosures and pretrial disclosures, pursuant to URCP 26. (R. 180)
On November 1, 201 7, Plaintiff filed his own Motion in Limine wherein it stated:
"The Defendant has never provided the Plaintiff with any disclosures, nor any
document, nor any form of evidence, nor any information as to what the
Defendant intends to present at trial."
"It is patently obvious that NO "good cause" exists for the Defendant not

providing the Plaintiff with anything, nor is said failure "harmless." Based upon
the Defendant's complete and total lack of compliance with any aspect of Rule 26,
and the overwhelming prejudice imposed upon the Plaintiff, by being forced to
expect solely and only the unexpected at trial, the Defendant should be prohibited
from having any witness testify and be barred from presenting any evidence at
trial."
(R.204)
On November 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Rule 26 pre-trial disclosures wherein his
proposed testimony included "the nature and extent of the Plaintiffs injuries; past,
present and future treatment; (sic) that the Plaintiff has had or may have which are
6
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reasonably related to the subject incident and are necessary for the Plaintiffs treatment;
lj

medical bills and lien . . ." (R. 210)
On November 7, 2017, the parties appeared before the trial court. Plaintiff argued
that the documentation provided was "all we have" and "[t]hat's all we've ever intended
to, to present all along .... we substantially complied in that we gave them all of the
~

records we have. (R. 408-409)
The trial court denied Defendant's motion in limine (the court characterized it as a
motion to dismiss) and proceeded with hearing. (R. 459)
Plaintiff Matt Lockin testified about the incident and his damages. (R. 418) The
salient portions of Plaintiffs testimony are listed as follows.
•

Plaintiff had problems breathing through his nose his entire life, prior to the 2007
septoplasty. (R. 421)

•

Plaintiff has had approximately six visits to his surgeon, including follow-up after
surgery.

•

Plaintiff had diagnostic images of his nose from these visits.

•

Plaintiff has sought treatment for breathing problems form his general practitioner
who he visits regularly, including one month before trial

•

Plaintiff treated with a psychiatrist, whose name he could not remember, six times
after this incident. (R. 441)
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•

Plaintiff testified that the surgery was "absolutely necessary" and that if they
would not have done it, he wouldn't be able to breathe out of one side of his nose.
(R. 423)

•

Plaintiff stated he was not able to breathe despite having the surgery because of
the scar tissue and because of the fact that it was a revisionary surgery, he was not
able to breathe as well as he could prior to the surgery. (R. 423)

•

Plaintiff stated that "it's going to be that way for the rest of my life." (R. 428)

•

Plaintiff stated that to this day he does not breathe as well as he did, and that he
snores "louder than you can imagine", which he stated he did not do prior to this
incident. (R. 431)

The district court issued its Memorandum Decision on November 14, 2017 and
entered Judgment against Defendant in the amount of $30,870.73. On February 27, 2018,
the judgment was amended to reflect special damages of $27,380.00. (R. 371)

ARGUMENT

1.

The trial court erred in failing to preclude Plaintiff from offering evidence at
trial in light of his failure to provide initial disclosures and untimely service of
pre-trial disclosures.

Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties, without waiting for
a discovery request, to serve on the other parties:
8
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~

a. each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and, except for an
adverse party, a summary of the expected testimony;
b. a copy of all documents ... in the possession or control of the party that the
party may offer in its case-in-chief, ...
c. a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable
documents or
evidentiary material on which such computation is based ...
d. a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment. ..
e. a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings (Id.).
Section (d)(4) provides that "[i[f a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a
disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness,
document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure." In this matter, the district court did not make a finding
of "good cause" or that the failure was "harmless."
The committee notes indicate that:
"the disclosure requirements and timing seek to reduce discovery costs by
requiring each party to produce, at an early stage in the case, and without a
discovery request, all of the documents and physical evidence the party may offer
in its case-in-chief and the names ofwitnesses the party may call in its case-inchief, with a description of their expected testimony. In this respect, the
vJ

amendments build on the initial disclosure requirements of the prior rules. In
addition to the disclosures required by the prior version ofRule 26(a)(l), a party
must disclose each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and a
summary ofthe witness's expected testimony, a copy ofall documents the party
9
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may offer in its case-in-chief, and all documents to which a party refers in its

~

pleadings.
With respect to medical record disclosure, the notes state:

"For example, defense counsel may be unable to interview a treating physician, so
the initial summary may only disclose that the witness will be questioned
concerning the plaintiff's diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. After medical
records have been obtained, the summary may be expanded or refined. "
If a party is going to offer "opinion testimony" the notes state:

"The rule does not require prefiled testimony or detailed descriptions of
everything a witness might say at trial. On the other hand, it requires more than
the broad, conclusory statements that often were made under the prior version of
Rule 26(a){l)(e.g., "The witness will testify about the events in question" or "The
witness will testify on causation. "). The intent ofthis requirement is to give the
other side basic information concerning the subjects about which the witness is
expected to testify at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's
relative importance in the case, whether the witness should be interviewed or
deposed, and whether additional documents or information concerning the witness
should be sought. This information is important because of the other discovery
limits contained in the 2011 amendments, particularly the limits on depositions."
"The rules require that such witnesses be identified and the information about
their anticipated testimony should include that which is required under Rule
10
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~

26(a)(l)(A)(ii), which should include any opinion testimony that a party expects to
elicit from them at trial. If a party has disclosed possible opinion testimony in its
Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) disclosures, that party is not required to prepare a separate
Rule 26(a)(4)(E) disclosure for the witness. And if that disclosure is made in
advance ofthe witness's deposition, those opinions should be explored in the
deposition and not in a separate expert deposition. "

Defendant submits that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate standard to
Plaintiff's untimely designation. There was never any finding of "reasonable
~

justification" or "harmlessness" of the information.
Clearly Defendant suffered prejudice as a result. First, there was no disclosure
regarding the fact that Plaintiff himself would offer opinion evidence regarding the
success, necessity and outcome of the surgical procedure. This is further complicated by
the fact that Plaintiff never provided full copies of medical records from his surgeon and
other treating physicians.
Rule 26 is designed to reduce litigation costs. Trial courts are encouraged to
enforce its provisions. "To make the disclosure requirement meaningful, and to
discourage sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to disclose important
information that is helpful to their case, they will not be able to use that information at
trial. The courts will be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the
party shows good cause for the failure." (Committee notes)

11
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In this matter the failure to disclose was prejudicial and should have resulted in an
order precluding Plaintiff from offering any evidence at trial. Therefore, the district court
should be reversed.

2.

The district court erred in allowing Plaintiff to provide expert opinion
testimony.

In Utah, the need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between
the defendant's negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of the injury.
Thus, where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an ordinary
lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, there must be
expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury. It is only in the most
obvious cases that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using expert
testimony to prove causation. See, Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 2014 UT App 180,
para. 10, 332 P.3d 969.
The only opinion testimony at trial was Plaintiffs undisclosed medical opinions.
As noted, Plaintiffs testimony included the following:
•

Plaintiff testified that the surgery was "absolutely necessary" and that if they
would not have done it, he wouldn't be able to breathe out of one side of his nose.
(R. 423)

~
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•

"'

Plaintiff stated he was not able to breathe despite having the surgery because of
the scar tissue and because of the fact that it was a revisionary surgery, he was not
able to breathe as well as he could prior to the surgery. (R. 423)

•

Plaintiff stated that "it's going to be that way for the rest of my life." (R. 428)

•

Plaintiff stated that to this day he does not breathe as well as he did, and that he
snores "louder than you can imagine", which he stated he did not do prior to this
incident. (R. 431)

Plaintiffs undisclosed medical opinions are further complicated by the fact that he
failed to disclose so many critical items related to his case. Again, as noted above,
Plaintiff acknowledged the following facts and related missing items in his case.
•

Plaintiff had problems breathing through his nose his entire life, prior to the 2007
septoplasty. (R. 421)

•

Plaintiff has had approximately six visits to his surgeon, including follow-up after
surgery.

•

Plaintiff had diagnostic images of his nose from these visits.

•

Plaintiff has sought treatment for breathing problems form his general practitioner
who he visits regularly, including one month before trial.

•

Plaintiff treated with a psychiatrist, whose name he could not remember, six times
after this incident. (R. 441)

In light of Plaintiff's relevant but undisclosed medical history, and the substance of
his medical opinions, it is apparent that this case is not one of "the most obvious cases."

It required expert testimony.
4fJ

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
decision of the trial court.
DATED this 13th day of November, 2018.

EDWARD W. McBRIDE

Isl Edward W. McBride
Edward W. McBride
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13 th day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief was emailed to the following:

Randall G. Phillips
2510 Washington Blvd., Suite 200
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pslawrandv:'£_l 2.mail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

Isl Edward McBride
Edward W. McBride
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Matthew Lockin,
Plaintiff

Memorandum Decision

V.

Case No. 140906063
Diego Ciulupa-K.aplun,
Defendant
Judge Katie Bernards-Goodman

On November 2, 2017, the parties appeared before the Court for an evidentiary hearing to

u

determine damages in this case.

Findings of Fact
1. On March 7, 2014, at Solitude Resort, Salt Lake County, Defendant intentionally struck
Plair.tiff in the face, causing a cut on Plaintiff's lip, breaking Plaintiffs nose and causing
a deviated septum.

2. Approximately fifteen to thirty minutes prior to the battery, Plaintiff and Defendant had
an altercation at the base of the ski hill that ended when Plaintiff pushed Defendant,
causing Defendant to fall down.

u

3. ''Defendant admits liability under the first cause of action (battery) and second cause of
action (intentional infliction of emotional distress)." Stipulation of Liability and
Mediation 1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
4. As a result of the injury, Plaintiff was unable to breathe through his nose.

5. Plaintiff underwent surgery on April 1, 2014, to correct the deviated septum.
6. Plaintiff suffered pain during the surgery.
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7. Plaintiff experienced pain for approximately one month following the surgery, in part
because of tubes that were temporarily placed in his nose.
8. Plaintiff also retains a scar of the cut on his lip, which makes him feel self-conscious and
reminds him of the battery.
9. Plaintiff now refrains from sporting activities in which he used to participate for fear of
additional injury to his nose.
10. As a result of the battery, Plaintiff has suffered emotional stress, including from the loss
of sleep, nightmares, and flashbacks to the incident.
11. Plaintiff had previously had surgery for a deviated septum in 2007. The original deviated
septum was a congenital condition.
12. Prior to the 2007 surgery, Plaintiff had difficulty breathing through his nose. After the
2007 surgery Plaintiff could breathe more easily through his nose.
13. All but $870.43 of the cost of the Aprill, 2017, surgery was covered by Plaintiff's
medical insurance provider.
14. Plaintiff filed a request for benefits with the Utah Office for Victims of Crime and
received reimbursement for medical expenses in the amoWlt of$751.40.
15. The Utah Office for Victims of Crime has subrogation rights to $751.40 of the damages
awarded in this case.

Discussion
Battery
In th.i5 case, Defendant "admits liability under the first cause of action (battery).,, Under
Utah law,
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An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a thfrd person,
or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and (b) a hannful contact with the
person of the other directly or indirectly results.,,

Wagner v. State of Utah, 2005 UT 54, 1 16, 122 P.3d 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts§ 13). "'Subject to liability'' is defined in the Restatement: 'The words 'subject to liability'
... denote the fact that the actor's conduct is such as to make him liable for another's injury, if
(a) the actor's conduct is a legal cause thereof, and (b) the actor has no defense applicable to the
particular claim." Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 5. The comment to section 5 explains that
[I]in order that the actor may be liable he must be subject to liability; but whether

his subjection to liability will ripen into liability depends (1) upon whether the
invasion of the other's legally protected interest results in a manner which makes
the law regard it as just to hold the actor responsible for it and which, therefore,
makes the actor's conduct the legal cause of the invasion, and (2) upon whether
he has a defense which is applicable to the particular claim asserted by the other."

Id. cmt. a. Under the Restatement, "(t]he word 'hann' is used ... to denote the existence of loss
or detriment _in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 7. The comments explain that "it is only when the harm is legally caused by the acts or
omissions of_another that a person has ... any legal rights in respect to the harm." Id. cmt. c.

By admitting liability for battery, Defendant has also admitted to harmful contact with
Plaintiff. The issue before the Court is what hann Defendant legally caused to Plaintiff.

In Utah, the need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between
the defendants' negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of the
injury. Thus, where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond
an orqinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a
finding, there must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the
injury. It is only in the most obvious cases that a plaintiff may be excepted from
the requirement of using expert testimony to prove causation.

3
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Hansen v. Hwper Excavating, Inc., 2014 UT App 180,110,332 P.3d 969 (citations, quotation
marks and alterations omitted).

In some aspects this case is one of"the most obvious cases." Some aspects of the harm
Plaintiff complains of are well within the common experience of a layperson. See Fox v.
Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, 1 23, 176 P.3d 446. No reasonable factfinder could
conclude tha,t a direct hit to the face was not the legal cause of hann to Plajntif£ Plaintiff
testified that the hit caused him to lose consciousness momentarily, that when he regained
consciousness he was on the floor and bleeding. Plaintiff further testified that after the assault he
was unable to breathe through one side of his nose and that surgery partially corrected the
problem. Furthermore, it is common understanding of a lay person that hitting another in the
face with such force as to cause the other to lose consciousness may necessitate medical attention
including possible surgery. It is also within common knowledge that surgery can be necessitated

by injury an~ that surgery and recovery can be painful. These are not "obscure medical factors"
requiring expert testimony. Here, Plaintiff testified that after the battery he had to wait for
surgery, that" the surgery was painful, that after the surgery he had tubes fixed in his nose for
approximately one month to aid in recovery, and that he experienced pain during that time.
Defendant is liable for this hann.

Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress

In this case, Defendant "admits liability under the ... second cause of action (intentional
infliction ofemotional distress.'' Under Utah law,
To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct
toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b)
where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his

4
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actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that
they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
vj

Cabaness v. '[homas, 2010 UT 23,136,232 P.3d 486 (citation and emphasis omitted).
Again, it is within the common knowledge of a layperson that intentional battery can
cause emotional distress to another. Here, Plaintiff testified that after the assault he experienced
a loss of sleep, nightmares, and flashbacks to the incident. This constitutes emotional distress, for
which Defendant is liable.

Punitive damages

vj

Generally,
[P]unitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or
omiss'ions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
Utah Code .A..nn. § 78B-8-201(1)(a). ''Purutive damages should be the amount necessary to fulfill
the two purposes of punitive damages: to punish past misconduct and to discourage future
misconduct.>' Amount of Punitive Damages, MUJI 2d, CV2027. "Even if[a] trial court
determine[s] that [a defendant]'s actions were the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, it has the discretion to award punitive damages, and likewise ... to deny
them." Long v. Stutesman, 2011 UT App 438, ,I 36, 269 P.3d 178.

Attorney Fees
The request for attorney fees is not properly before the court. "A party may not make a
motion in a memorandum opposing a motion or in a reply memorandum." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(n).
Here, it appears that Plaintiff's first request for attorney fees appears in Plaintiff's Reply to

5
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Defendant's Objection to Continue Evidentiary Hearing. Plaintiff did not raise the issue of
attorney fees at the November 2, 2017, hearing, and Defendant has not had an opportunity to
respond to the request.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Defendant's intentional battery
~

was the legaJ cause of hann to Plaintiff. Additionally that Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as
a result of Defendant's intentional acts. The extent of the harm Defendant caused is set forth in
the Findings of Fact. The Court \vill not award punitive damages in this case.
The Final Judgment in this case is entered concurrently with this Memorandum Decision.

Dat~d lY d,o.\ ,

l

o E J\,)1h1

,

201 7.

By the Court

Ju ge Katie Bernards-Go
District Court Judge

~
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